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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE INTERNATIONAL Telecommunication Union (ITU),
which is a specialized agency under the United Nations,
adopts international regulations and treaties governing all ter-
restrial and space use of the radio frequency spectrum.' The
ITU, as an intergovernmental organization, has no authority to
force the settlement of potential frequency conflicts between
different communications systems. The only authorities with
the power to settle these conflicts are the local telecommunica-
tions regulators and administrators who regulate the radio fre-
quency spectrum within the nation's borders. The ITU provides
an international venue where disputes are addressed and re-
solved. This venue becomes more important as frequency con-
flicts arise between communication systems and communication
I See Jannat C. Thompson, Space for Rent: The International Telecommunications
Union, Space Law, and Orbit/Spectrum Leasing, 62J. AIR L. & COM. 279, 286 (1996).
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frequencies that are the responsibility of more than one sover-
eign nation.
2
The accelerating development of commercially funded satel-
lite communications systems over the last ten years presented
the ITU with the problem of attempting to resolve frequency
conflicts between satellite systems that are located and operated
within different sovereign nations. Commercial satellite com-
munication systems that operate over more than one country
must coordinate with the ITU to prevent frequency conflicts
with other communications networks,3 but the ITU lacks the au-
thority to force any of these entities to agree on a mutually bene-
ficial use of the frequency spectrum. If these frequency conflicts
arise between entities operating within one nation, the local
telecommunications regulator has the sovereign's authority to
resolve this conflict. Because conflicts between satellite systems
occur over international boundaries, conflict resolution is
achieved by sovereign diplomats, who are responsible to local
telecommunications regulators, and by satellite system Chief Ex-
ecutive Officers (CEOs), who must protect their business inter-
ests. When these diverse interests converge at the ITU, an
organization with no authority to enforce a negotiated settle-
ment, disagreements and an inefficient use of the available ra-
dio frequency spectrum results.
Presently, several proposed multi-billion dollar commercial
satellite systems are delayed because their corporations are un-
able to negotiate an agreement to share the frequency spectrum
within important regions of the world that contain rich popula-
tions of potential customers. 4 These disagreements are disas-
trous to the commercial prospects of satellite communications
companies and to the cooperative environment that the ITU at-
tempts to foster. If the global telecommunications marketplace
fractures into many different regulatory zones that only license
spectrum to local communications systems, then the rapidly
growing commercial satellite industry, which is global in nature,
2 Inter-satellite links that carry information from one satellite to another in
space are not the responsibility of any one nation.
3 Other communications networks include satellite and terrestrial communica-
tions networks.
4 ICO Global Communications in London offers a global mobile satellite
phone system that is not licensed within the United States, and Skybridge, which
is backed by Alcatel of France, proposes a satellite system, which may have a fre-
quency conflict with many United States satellite systems. The United States rep-
resents about 38% of the world telecommunications market.
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will cease to grow. The business plans of many new satellite sys-
tems, especially the low earth orbit constellations, depend upon
obtaining frequency spectrum throughout most of the world.
Without international agreement, hundreds of thousands of
new high-paying jobs and tens of billions of dollars of privately
funded telecommunications development will not occur.
The ITU must find a better way of encouraging commercially
driven satellite systems to efficiently utilize the radio frequency
spectrum. The ITU is presently a forum where sovereign ambas-
sadors, who support the telecommunications policies of their
sponsoring nations, negotiate the global use of radio frequency
spectrum. Because most of these satellite systems are proposed
by commercially motivated business entities, it could be argued
that these ambassadors lack the authority or experience to nego-
tiate the commercial issues inherent in the spectrum allocation
process.
The ITU should allow global business entities to represent
their own global interests at the ITU because the growing power
of business entities in satellite communications cause many of
the frequency conflicts before the ITU. Business people are
more qualified than government appointed ambassadors to re-
solve frequency conflicts caused by other business people. A
government appointed diplomat from Ghana probably lacks the
authority to request that competing satellite systems share spec-
trum and customers in Latin America and compete elsewhere.
Business negotiations and diplomatic negotiations differ. Busi-
ness negotiations should be encouraged in an ITU venue that
currently supports diplomatic negotiations, yet business people
and business decisions currently tear the ITU apart.
The ITU Radio Communications Bureau attempts to avoid
satellite system frequency conflicts through its satellite coordina-
tion process and its Radio Regulations. The satellite coordina-
tion process, which requires that a satellite system give advanced
publication and notification of the global frequencies it intends
to use, is controlled by the administration or country (notifying
authority) deemed responsible for a satellite system. The same
administrations and countries are also responsible for sending
delegates to the World Radio Conferences, where changes are
made to the Radio Regulations of the ITU.5
5 See Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, opened for
signature Oct. 25, 1973, ch. 1, § 5, art. 7, (visited Oct. 18, 1999) <http://
www.itu.int/publications/cchtm/cnvhtm> [hereinafter ITU Convention].
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The entities behind the commercially driven satellite systems
theoretically receive adequate representation through the na-
tions that choose to represent their interests before the ITU. In
order to encourage more negotiation between these commer-
cially driven entities, this paper suggests two proposals. First,
the responsibility for coordinating a satellite system should be-
long to the entity that originally proposed the system, not to the
administration or country that supports that entity's interests.
Second, the ITU should allow only one delegate per nation to
attend the World Radio Conference (WRC), which would pre-
vent business entities from representing sovereign nations as
delegates.6 Neither of these suggestions applies to terrestrial
communications systems, because conflicts with terrestrial sys-
tems should be addressed at the local regulatory level.7
These two suggestions will increase business-style negotiations
at the ITU without upsetting the power of sovereign nations to
control the spectrum allocation process. If business leaders re-
move their diplomatic masks, they may become more aggressive
in making business decisions. This paper demonstrates how
these two suggestions will result in minimal impact on the power
of sovereigns at the ITU and a positive impact on the efficient
allocation of the commercially available spectrum. This paper
also demonstrates that implementation of these suggestions har-
monizes with the global trend of decreased government control
of commercially funded telecommunications development.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE LIMITED RADIO FREQUENCY SPECTRUM
An electromagnetic radiowave carries voice, data, television,
or other telecommunications content from one point to an-
other without the use of wires or cables. In general, content
6 Most nations have multi-party delegations providing them with a wide variety
of technical and regulatory expertise and helping them deal with the diversity of
issues presented at the WRC. As discussed later in this paper, these nations may
keep their multi-party delegations as long as the voting head of the delegation is
the only official representative of that nation at the WRC.
7 Global balloon systems, such as the Sky Station system, are treated like satel-
lites for the purposes of this paper. Even though local terrestrial systems present
huge international spectrum issues for global satellite systems, these spectrum
issues remain local. This paper addresses a global solution for the global spec-
trum problem of global satellite systems competing for the same spectrum across
the globe. This paper asserts that a spectrum conflict between a terrestrial system
and a satellite system is a local issue that should be handled by the local regulator
within each nation.
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must be carried over different frequencies, because two or more
radiowaves sent at the same frequency interfere with one an-
other." Frequency interference leads to the cancellation or deg-
radation of the telecommunications content carried on that
frequency.
Frequency is the number of times a radio wave goes through
its complete cycle in one second of time. One cycle per second
is referred to as one hertz; one thousand cycles per second is
referred to as one kilohertz (KHz); one million cycles per sec-
ond is referred to as one megahertz (MHz); and one billion cy-
cles per second is referred to as one gigahertz (GHz). 9 By
transmitting telecommunications content over radio waves at
different KHz, MHz, or GHz frequencies, the transmitter avoids
interference with others transmitting at similar frequencies.
The radio frequency spectrum (or spectrum) is simply the
range of electromagnetic radiowave frequencies used in the
transmission of telecommunications content.10 If an entity "has
spectrum," the entity has a right to use a range of frequencies to
deliver their telecommunications content. In general, spectrum
is a limited resource because only one entity can use the fre-
quencies within a slice of spectrum at any one time in the same
geographical area. Rights to the limited resource of spectrum
must be negotiated like the rights to precious minerals, oil, and
fresh water.
B. THE COMMERCIALLY FUNDED SATELLITE
COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION
1. GEO, LEO, and MEO Satellites
A satellite's speed prevents the earth's gravity from pulling it
to earth. The great height of satellites allows them to cover
large areas of the ground as they circle the earth. A communi-
cations satellite is essentially a tall cellular, microwave, or televi-
sion tower that relays telecommunications signals in the form of
radiowaves to receivers on the earth.1 Satellite communications
hold advantages over "terrestrial" or ground communications,
because they do not require a large infrastructure investment in
8 Multiple-access schemes and spread spectrum modulation architectures like
CDMA or TDMA are not relevant to this basic explanation.
9 See JOSEPH N. PELTON, THE "How To" OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 212
(Silvano F. Payne ed., 2d ed. 1995).
1o See id. at 226.
1 See id. at 11.
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cables, wires, or towers to enlighten large geographical regions
with enhanced telecommunications services.1 2
Satellites are often classified by the altitude of their orbit.
Low earth orbit (LEO) satellites fly at heights between 800 and
1600 kilometers; medium earth orbit (MEO) satellites fly at ap-
proximately 13,000 kilometers altitude; and geosynchronous
earth orbit (GEO) satellites fly at 35,786 kilometers altitude. 13
The orbital altitudes of communications satellites can assist or
detract from their mission. The GEO satellites move with the
rotation of the earth, which allows them to offer a stationary
platform for telecommunications coverage relative to the sur-
face of the earth. 14 Their height allows them coverage of a geo-
graphic area as large as one third of the earth, but this height
also forces signals reaching them to experience at least a quarter
of a second delay. 5 This delay can disrupt the flow of a tele-
phone conversation or the complex "handshake" between com-
puters connected to a communications network.'
6
The communications delay inherent in GEO satellites can be
overcome by using LEO satellites, but the low altitude of LEO
satellites forces many satellites to cover the same area that one
GEO satellite could cover.1 7 The LEO satellites, unlike the sta-
tionary GEO satellites, move in relation to the receivers on the
ground below them."8 The movement and low altitude of LEO
satellites force system architects to design LEO systems that in-
clude multiple ground stations or the use of complex inter-satel-
lite communication links between the satellites within the LEO
constellation. 19 Unlike stationary GEO satellites built to serve
one nation or one geographical region, the construction of a
LEO or MEO system can only be justified if the potential opera-
tor intends to serve multiple nations over many geographical
locations.2 °
12 See PETER G.W. KEEN, EVERY MANAGER'S GUIDE TO INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
243 (2d ed. 1995).
13 See PELTON, supra note 9, at 11-12.
14 See id. at 11.
15 See id. at 167, 180.
16 See id. at 131; see also Global Satellite Marketplace 99-Clearing the Hurdles: The
Satcom Industry Focuses on Execution, MERILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER, & SMITH, INC.
110 (April 14, 1999).
17 See PELTON, supra note 9, at 180.
18 See id. at 218.
19 See id. at 168.
20 If an entity wants to serve only one rich geographical region, it is less expen-
sive to build and launch one GEO satellite than it is to construct multiple LEO
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Attributes of MEO satellites are similar to LEO satellites ex-
cept MEO satellites view more of the earth's surface.21 Addition-
ally, a disadvantage of MEO satellites compared to LEO satellites
is that MEO satellites require more power and complexity to
perform tasks than LEO satellites. 22
2. The Market-Oriented and Commercially Funded Satellite
Revolution
A revolution in communications satellites has occurred over
the last ten years. Driven by tens of billions of dollars in private
investment, thousands of new communications satellites were
produced or proposed. Private businesses and business-ori-
ented arms of intergovernmental organizations, such as the In-
ternational Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(INTELSAT) 23 and the International Maritime Satellite Organi-
zation (INMARSAT), proposed these new satellite system which
use low and medium orbits that were not previously used for
commercial communications.24
For the purposes of this paper, key aspects of this satellite
communications revolution are the increased number of mar-
ket-oriented participants and the increased desire for spectrum
that is controlled by more than one nation. As stated above,
most of the satellite systems proposed and developed over the
last ten years were led by business-oriented entities. Private com-
panies, like Iridium and Skybridge, and intergovernmental orga-
nizations, like INTELSAT and INMARSAT, compete for
investment capital and international customers tojustify the cap-
ital expenditure involved in building their global systems. 5
Whether motivated by dreams of huge profits or universal ser-
vice to the world's poor, market forces steer and affect these
entities. If a proposed satellite communications system cannot
satellites and ground stations. The justification for the construction of a LEO
system originates from the potential to serve more than one geographical region.
21 See PELTON, supra note 9, at 180.
22 See id. at 183-84.
23 See id. at 21, 23.
24 See id. at 167-68.
25 Satellite communications systems cost from hundreds of millions to the mul-
tiple billions of dollars to construct and launch. Because satellite systems cost so
much to construct, it is logical to assume that those building these systems de-
velop detailed plans to justify their construction. Private companies and intergov-
ernmental organizations may have different motivations for building satellite
systems, but neither have the resources to waste billions of dollars on satellite
projects that do not have at least a perceived return on investment capital.
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demonstrate a reasonable return on investment, then banks and
other financial entities will not provide capital to fund it.26 With
only a handful of European banks currently providing financing
for satellite communications projects and the Asian economies
presently in turmoil, most of the investment capital for these
new systems comes from banks within the United States. 27 In-
vestment and commercial banks within the United States do not
have the capital to fund all of the proposed satellite systems.
The analysts within these banks, who decide which projects to
finance, will evaluate each proposal for its ability to gain enough
customers to earn a positive return on investment under market
conditions. Potential operators must show they have a good
business plan, and that they will serve a large market if they ex-
pect to receive investment capital for their satellite systems.
Almost all of the entities proposing global satellite systems re-
alize that they must have a good business plan, and they must
market their satellite services to customers throughout the
globe. Acquiring the right to use radio frequency spectrum
within many different nations is a prerequisite to funding most
of the new satellite systems and all of the new LEO and MEO
systems.28 The use of inter-satellite links on some of the new
LEO systems is a global spectrum issue that must also be re-
solved by many different nations, because these inter-satellite ra-
dio waves travel through globally shared and internationally
regulated regions of outer space.29 Whether the frequency spec-
trum is within the atmosphere or in outer space, operators of
global satellite systems must show investment bankers that they
26 Even organizations, like INTELSAT, that lack a true profit motive must con-
vince their boards of directors that they will receive a return on investment that
justifies the investment of the partner countries. Even so, most of the interfer-
ence problems before the ITU are not associated with INTELSAT or INMARSAT,
but with their commercial spin-offs like ICO Global Communications and New
Skies.
27 See Satellite Projects, INT'L SPACE INDUSTRY REP., Oct. 26, 1998, at 4.
28 Since LEO and MEO satellite systems are not stationary, they will cover most
of the globe. It is difficult to justify the construction of an inherently global satel-
lite system if it does not access many of the potential customers below it.
29 See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened
for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967)
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. Article II of this treaty states, "Outer Space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appro-
priation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means." Id. at art. II.
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can acquire spectrum regulated by many different nations to se-
cure capital to build their satellite systems.
C. LOCAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION
The use of the radio frequency spectrum within a nation's
borders will always be a sovereignty issue. No nation should be
able to bombard another nation with its radio, television, or
other telecommunication signals without inviting conflict. The
radio frequency spectrum within a nation is normally controlled
and administered by an agency of the government, such as the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) within the United
States, or a quasi-governmental organization called a Post, Tele-
graph, and Telephone (PTT).
A government agency, such as the FCC, usually regulates the
use of spectrum by other government, private, domestic, and
foreign entities within that nation. A local PTT usually regulates
the use of spectrum and owns most or all of the entities provid-
ing telecommunications services within that nation. Because
PTTs normally provide many of the telecommunications serv-
ices within their nations, they frequently attempt to control the
exploitation of the spectrum to impede the growth of potential
competitors. The restrictive environment created by PTTs is
currently loosening with the privatization of PTTs and the de-
regulation of telecommunications services within these nations.
D. INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION REGULATION
1. The International Telecommunication Union
Many telecommunication signals and services do not stop at
the borders of the nation where they originated. The Interna-
tional Telegraph Union was founded in 1865 to establish stan-
dards for the interconnection of telegraph networks across
European boundaries.30 In 1934, the name changed to the In-
ternational Telecommunication Union (ITU) to reflect the in-
clusion of all forms of communication. 3' In 1947, the ITU
became a specialized agency of the United Nations.3 2
30 See International Telecommunication Union, ITU's History (visited Oct. 18,





The ITU is not a supranational organization, and it lacks a
permanent charter.33 The 1973 Convention of the ITU and the
Radio Regulations of the ITU have the force of international
treaties, but individual countries can make reservations or decla-
rations adverse to agreements made at the ITU.34 The ability to
escape from unpopular agreements made at the ITU effectively
allows individual nations to maintain sovereignty over the spec-
trum within their border. In spite of the ITU, control of the
radio frequency spectrum is left firmly in the hands of the local
regulator within each nation.
2. The Radio Regulations and the World Radio Conference
In 1903, the pre-ITU entity convened an International Radio-
telegraph Conference to discuss the regulation of wireless teleg-
raphy, and the first regulations governing wireless telegraphy
were signed in 1906.35 These regulations, which are known to-
day as the Radio Regulations, were updated and amended con-
tinuously at other conferences since that first conference in
1906. 36 Changes to these regulations authorized the construc-
tion and implementation of new services, like satellite services,
within particular frequency bands.
The WRC convenes approximately every two years to vote
upon proposed changes to the Radio Regulations. Radio fre-
quency spectrum for particular types of satellite and other wire-
less communications systems is determined at the WRC. Voting
is accomplished by the member nations of the ITU where a max-
imum of one proxy vote is given to each nation.3 7 Each nation
may to have more than one person on its delegation as long as
the overall delegation has the power to represent its govern-
ment without restriction and sign the Final Acts of the WRC.
3 1
The Final Acts of the WRC represent the changes that will even-
tually be implemented to the Radio Regulations.
3. The Table of Frequency Allocations
An International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) was es-
tablished to manage the radio frequency spectrum, and the Ta-
3s See Thompson, supra note 1, at 286.
34 See id. at 287.
35 See ITU's History, supra note 30.
36 See id.
37 See ITU Convention, supra note 5, ch. 2, art. 31.
- See id.
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ble of Frequency Allocations (TFA) became a mandatory
register to all nations that are members of the ITU. 39 The TFA
lists specific frequency bands allocated to particular types of
communications services.4" The specific frequency bands in the
TFA were determined by the Radio Regulations or at WRCs.' 1
The TFA's purpose was to prevent interference between com-
munication stations in the air, in space, on the ground, or out at
sea.42 The TFA, however, did not list the actual communication
systems that would utilize the spectrum set aside within the
table.
4. Priority Allocations
"Frequency allocations may be exclusive, primary, permitted,
or secondary '4 depending on the intended use of the set aside
frequency band in the TFA. The highest classification is the ex-
clusive allocation, which permits sole use of the assigned fre-
quency band. 44 "[0] ther types of allocations involve some form
of frequency sharing" between potentially interfering communi-
cations systems.45
The most common type of allocation is the multiple primary
or co-primary allocation which allows two or more services to
share the same frequency bands within the TFA.46 A local regu-
lator from a national administration maintains responsibility for
coordinating systems within that nation if these systems share on
a multiple primary basis.47 Competing satellite systems that
must share globally controlled spectrum on a multiple primary
basis rely on the impotent ITU and the thousands of local regu-
lators within each nation to complete the coordination of their
systems. This coordination process, whether local or global, is
controlled by the national administrations that regulate tele-
communications within their local markets.
39 See ITU's History, supra note 30.
40 See id.
41 See International Telecommunication Union, Sharing The Spectrum: A Matter
of International Negotiations (visited Oct. 20, 1999) <http://www.itu.int/new-
sarchive/press/wrc97/sharing-the-spectrum.html>.
42 See ITU's History, supra note 30.




46 See id. at 92.
47 See id. at 89.
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5. Master International Frequency Register
The actual communications systems that use the frequency
bands set aside in the TFA record and register their intended
frequency assignment, and where appropriate, their orbital
characteristics in the Master International Frequency Register
(Master Register).48 The national administration, government
agency, or PTT of the country responsible for a communications
system is responsible for publishing the technical specifications
of its system in the Master Register.49 Any entity may consult the
Master Register and ascertain which communications systems
are using a particular frequency and the country which is that
system's notifying authority.
III. CURRENT SATELLITE COORDINATION PROCESS
The operator of a satellite communications system must over-
come local and global regulatory barriers if it intends to operate
in more than one nation. Additionally, the system must be au-
thorized by the ITU to use global spectrum, and the operator
must obtain a license from the local regulator to use this spec-
trum within every nation that it wants to serve.5" If a satellite
system receives the ITU's authorization to use global spectrum,
but it is not licensed within a particular country, then it lacks the
authority to serve that country.5
The satellite system coordination process is the unofficial
name for the set of procedures that an entity must follow
through to get its system approved by the ITU and licensed in
several key countries. Some may feel that this process ends
when coordination with the ITU is complete, but a satellite sys-
tem that can not obtain a license in a few rich countries may
never get the investment capital to be built. The Radio Commu-
nication Bureau of the ITU desires to operate the maximum
number of radio channels in those portions of the spectrum
where harmful interference between satellite systems may oc-
cur.52 If this goal is to be achieved, a satellite system's ability to
48 See ITU Convention, supra note 5, ch. 1, § 5, art. 12.
49 See id.
50 See GORDON & MORGAN, supra note 43, at 89.
51 Smaller hand-held communicators like Iridium phones and ORBCOMM
pagers could operate without a license, but this would be a violation of that na-
tion's sovereignty and customs laws. This paper assumes that satellite companies
do not want to break the laws of sovereign nations.
52 See ITU Convention, supra note 5, ch. 1, § 5, art. 12.
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obtain local licenses and investment capital should be as valua-
ble as its ability to use the available spectrum efficiently.
A. ALLOCATION OF GLOBAL SPECTRUM FOR INTENDED
SATELLITE SERVICE
As discussed previously in sections II.D (2) and (3)," a satel-
lite system operates within particular frequency bands only if
that type of satellite service is allocated a frequency within the
Radio Regulations and the TFA. An entity proposing a satellite
system must ensure that sufficient spectrum is set aside within
the Radio Regulations to enable the operation of the proposed
service. In order to accomplish this, the entity must be able to
effect changes to the Radio Regulations at the WRC.
Issues discussed and resolved at the WRC are proposed and
voted upon by the representatives of national governments.
The entity described above must be represented by a national
government at the WRC if that entity wants spectrum set aside
for its satellite service in the Radio Regulations.
Within the United States and Europe, the lobbying and nego-
tiating that occurs between national governments and the satel-
lite systems that they represent at the WRC are time consuming,
expensive, and sometimes ineffective. In order to streamline
this process, the United States established a World Radio Con-
ference Advisory Committee (WRCAC), consisting primarily of
satellite industry representatives, to assist the U.S. government
in establishing an agenda beneficial to U.S. companies at the
WRC.5 4 The Europeans use a Conference Preparatory Group
(CPG) to advise the European Conference of Postal and Tele-
communications Administrations (CEPT)55 to help establish an
agenda beneficial to their companies at the WRC.56 This prepa-
ration process normally lasts for two years before the actual
WRC.
The WRCAC and the CPG are valiant attempts by the U.S.
and European governments to represent their constituents ef-
fectively, but neither government is obligated or able to repre-
sent the desires of the satellite systems that assist their
53 See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
54 See Scott Blake Harris, Reform the WRC Process, SATELLITE COMMS., Mar.
1998, at 16.
55 CEPT forms an agenda that represents 43 countries, including the 15 coun-
tries of the European Union, at the WRC.
56 See Gerald E. Oberst Jr., Working on the WRC, VIA SATELLITE, July 1998, at
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preparation for the WRC. Often, too many conflicting positions
between national regulators and competing communications
systems prevent one agenda from being agreeable to all parties.
Other communication systems within these nations want to allo-
cate spectrum for their terrestrial or satellite service, and the
governments of these nations want to allocate spectrum for use
by government agencies like the military.
After surviving this process, the entity proposing a satellite sys-
tem will have its agenda included in the national agenda for the
WRC. Additionally, the entity will probably be permitted to
have one or more of its employees serve as an official member of
that nation's delegation to the WRC. As mentioned previously
in section II.D (2) 5 7 of this article, the delegates of a member
nation must have the full authority of that nation to represent it
at the WRC. Thus, a delegate from a U.S. satellite company rep-
resents the position of the United States at the WRC. Neither
the U.S. government, nor any other member nation of the ITU,
allows one of its delegates to espouse anything but the national
position at the WRC, because anything less would undermine
that nation's stance on key issues at the WRC. When employees
of satellite systems attend the WRC as delegates, they are not
permitted to promote their satellite system's agenda if it con-
flicts with the national agenda. They are not advocates for their
business; rather, they are advocates for the nation.
If the U.S. government, the Europeans, or any other nation
proposes an agenda at the WRC agreeable to the other member
nations, then that agenda will be voted into approval. Hope-
fully, sufficient spectrum will be allocated in the Radio Regula-
tions to allow the entity proposing a satellite system to offer its
service. Otherwise, this entity can only hope that the nation 58
representing its agenda promote this agenda with more success
at the next WRC in two years.
B. ADVANCED PUBLICATION AND INTERFERENCE COORDINATION
An entity proposing a satellite system must eventually publish,
in the Master Register, its intent to operate that system within
57 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
58 Often, satellite companies have representatives serving on more than one
national delegation during the WRC. This allows a satellite company to promote
its agenda throughout the world, and it unofficially allows each national delega-
tion to discover the intentions of other nations at the WRG. This paper proposes
making some of these practices official in order to encourage negotiation and
discourage unnecessary secrecy.
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the frequency bands assigned to it in the Radio Regulations.5"
The Radio Regulations provide procedures for advanced publi-
cation, interference coordination, and notification to help re-
solve frequency conflicts between all potential communications
systems that desire to operate within the frequency bands set
aside.6" Unless the Radio Regulations stipulate that the satellite
services offered within this band are allocated on an exclusive
basis, the entity proposing the satellite system must share the
spectrum in this band with other users.61 It is extremely unlikely
that frequency bands appropriated to commercial satellite serv-
ices will ever be allocated on an exclusive basis.
The advanced publication, interference coordination, and no-
tification procedures helping satellite systems resolve conflicts
over shared spectrum are controlled by national governments. 62
A national administration, also known as the "Notifying Author-
ity," must give the Radio Communications Bureau of the ITU all
of the relevant technical information for a satellite system pro-
posed by one of its constituents. 63 The entity responsible for the
satellite system may not do this on its own.64
When the advanced publication information for a proposed
satellite system is filed with the ITU, other nations have four
months to file their comments with the Bureau and the nation
that is sponsoring the satellite system. 65 If another nation ob-
jects to the satellite system's proposed use of the frequency, then
coordination procedures begin between the nation responsible
for the system and any objecting nation.66 In theory, over a time
period of a few months (not years), the Notifying Authority will
negotiate a spectrum-sharing plan with other nations that is
agreeable to all of the coordinating nations. All parties can use
the ITU-R technical standards or some other universally agreed
upon technical standards to assist in this process. The ITU of-
fers its assistance in resolving any disputes, but it lacks the au-
thority to enforce any decision. Member nations of the ITU
involved in the coordination proceedings are the only entities








66 See GORDON & MORGAN, supra note 43, at 89-90.
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that possess the authority to enforce a spectrum-sharing plan for
the proposed satellite system. The entity that originally pro-
poses the satellite system must work through the nation that is
its Notifying Authority if it hopes to receive an adequate sharing
plan. If the Notifying Authority fails, then that satellite system
may fail.
C. OBTAINING LICENSES WITHIN THE KEY NATIONS OF
THE WORLD
When an adequate spectrum-sharing arrangement has been
agreed upon at the ITU, the entity proposing a satellite system
must still have its system licensed to operate within the nations
that it desires to serve. If any of the previously mentioned steps
in the satellite coordination process meet resistance from a par-
ticular nation, then an opportunity arises for that nation to deny
a license to the offending satellite system. As mentioned in sec-
tion II.D (1)67 of this article, nations can opt out of agreements
made before the ITU. If a nation opposed a particular type of
satellite service offered in a particular frequency band, then that
nation could ignore the decisions of the ITU, even if every other
member nation of the ITU supported that service.
It is the responsibility of the entity that proposed the satellite
system to acquire national licenses for the system. The entity
leverages its own negotiating ability with the lobbying power of
national governments to help it acquire licenses around the
world. This is, however, an expensive process, and many satel-
lite systems never acquire licenses in the key countries that they
want to serve. Coordinating a satellite system with the ITU and
coordinating the acquisition of national licenses are two sepa-
rate matters. For the sake of the business-driven entities that
propose these satellite systems, this is an unfortunate reality.
IV. THE PROBLEM
In order to acquire the use of global spectrum for a satellite
system, the entity responsible for that system must complete a
long and inflexible process. The entity proposing the satellite
system must convince different nations to bless the operation of
its system at the potential expense of other communications sys-
tems that those nations may want to champion. National gov-
ernment telecommunication regulators and diplomats will
67 See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
1999]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
always control this long and inflexible process because this is
presently the best way for them to provide for the needs of their
citizens and constituents.
Whether a capitalist or a quasi-socialist entity proposes a satel-
lite system, the need to please shareholders, investors, and pay-
ing customers drives that entity to make decisions which are
more business driven than the decisions of a diplomat or tele-
communications regulator. Making business decisions requires
decisiveness, clarity, flexibility, and timeliness. A business entity
proposing a satellite system cannot be decisive or clear if their
regulatory position must harmonize with the interests of the na-
tion that represents them before the ITU. A business entity can-
not be timely or flexible when, over a two year period, it must
confidentially coordinate its decision making with nations repre-
senting it at the WRC.68
Business-driven decisions encourage the entities proposing
satellite systems to promote their own regulatory position at the
ITU when the position of the nation that represents them
before the ITU is not working. Business-driven decision making
allows these entities to change their allegiance from one na-
tional regulatory agenda to another when it fits the business
needs of the satellite system. Business-driven decision making
may force these entities to negotiate spectrum-sharing arrange-
ments with competitors that are represented by opposing
nations.
Within the United States, the FCC is authorized to resolve
spectrum conflicts between communications systems that com-
pete for use of the same frequency spectrum. 69 Because clear
winners and losers may emerge when the FCC resolves a spec-
trum conflict, the business-driven entities involved in these dis-
putes will adjust their regulatory positions and business plans to
salvage a solution that pleases their shareholders, investors, and
potential customers. Adjustments in regulatory positions and
business plans may occur hundreds of times over a period of
months if the business entity wants its proposed satellite system
to survive. Even though the ITU lacks the enforcement author-
68 Global satellite systems are often represented by the delegates of many na-
tions which gives these systems increased influence over the ITU process and also
increases the level of secrecy where satellite companies must negotiate because
having representatives on different nations' delegations presents satellite compa-
nies with conflicts of national loyalty and interest. Such secrecy does not stimu-
late increased and open negotiating.
69 See GORDON & MORGAN, supra note 43, at 89.
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ity that the FCC has within the United States, a regulatory re-
gime could be developed at the ITU to encourage the flexibility
and efficiency of business style negotiations.
V. A SOLUTION: BUSINESS-DRIVEN NEGOTIATIONS AT
THE ITU
In order to encourage more business-style negotiations at the
ITU, two changes should be made. First, the responsibility for
coordinating a satellite system through the ITU's advanced pub-
lication and interference coordination process should be upon
the entity that originally proposed the system, not to the admin-
istration or country that supports that entity's interests. Second,
the ITU should allow only one delegate per nation to attend the
World Radio Conference, because this change would prevent
business entities from representing sovereign nations as
delegates.
A. SOLUTION 1: INTERFERENCE COORDINATION BECOMES THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ENTITY PROPOSING A
SATELLITE SYSTEM
As mentioned in section III.B70 of this article, the advanced
publication and interference coordination of a satellite system
must be undertaken by a sovereign nation. A diplomat repre-
senting a sovereign nation lacks authority to change a satellite
system's business plan or the flexibility to change the regulatory
position of his nation on short notice. An entity proposing a
satellite system possesses authority and flexibility to change the
business plan, the spectrum-sharing plan, and the regulatory po-
sition of a proposed satellite system in order to negotiate the use
of spectrum with others. The advanced publication and inter-
ference coordination process should be the responsibility of the
business-driven entities that propose satellite systems, because
these entities have the sole authority and flexibility to negotiate
for spectrum-sharing arrangements that are in their own
interests.
If this responsibility is given to these entities, they will have to
coordinate the use of spectrum with every entity or national gov-
ernment that challenges the use of that spectrum. This change
should increase business-driven negotiations over global spec-
trum sharing, because a business-driven entity would be directly
70 See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
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responsible for these negotiations instead of a sovereign
diplomat.
B. SOLUTION 2: ENTITIES PROPOSING SATELLITE SYSTEMS
CANNOT REPRESENT SOVEREIGN NATIONS As DELEGATES
Sovereign nations often send delegations to the WRC that in-
clude employees of proposed satellite systems with pressing is-
sues before the WRC. All of the delegates that a sovereign
nation sends to the WRC, regardless of their prior affiliation,
must support the position of their nation before the ITU. As
mentioned previously in section II.D (2)71 of this article, a dele-
gate espousing a position on an issue that is different than his
nation's position is a traitor who could undermine the power of
his nation before the ITU.
If each nation is only allowed one delegate at the WRC, then
entities proposing satellite systems could not place their employ-
ees on national delegations. These entities would still coordi-
nate their agendas with the agendas of other nations prior to
the WRC, but they would not be locked into the position of one
nation during at the WRC. If a particular nation's position is
unsuccessful at the WRC, then the representatives of a proposed
satellite system can immediately abandon the position of that
nation at the WRC and find a solution that works for their satel-
lite system's business. This could not occur if these representa-
tives were delegates who had to support one nation's position.
C. NEITHER CHANGE WILL DECREASE THE POWER OF
SOVEREIGN NATIONS BEFORE THE ITU
Many changes could be made to the ITU Convention that
would improve the resolution of spectrum conflicts, but most of
these changes would never be implemented because they would
threaten the power of sovereign nations at the ITU. The two
solutions presented above are designed to enhance the resolu-
tion of spectrum conflicts at the ITU without significantly affect-
ing the present bureaucratic structure of the ITU or the power
that sovereign nations wield at the ITU.
Neither of these changes affects the power that national gov-
ernments possess at the ITU, because national governments will
have the power to vote at WRC's and the power to deny local
licenses to satellite systems. National governments will only lose
71 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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the official power to represent entities in the interference coor-
dination process (Solution 1) and the official power to place
representatives of satellite systems on their WRC delegations
(Solution 2).
Loss of official power is insignificant because national govern-
ments will be able to control and manipulate their incorporated
entities and other national citizens. If a nation wants to control
the interference coordination process of one of its satellite com-
panies, it can nationalize that company or force that company to
obey the sovereign's orders. If a nation fears that its citizens or
companies will espouse positions different than the national po-
sition at a WRC, then that nation can order all of its citizens or
companies to support the national position. If the entity pro-
posing a global satellite system is completely or partially owned
by a national government, then that entity may decide to have
all of its actions before the ITU handled by the national
government.
National governments should have the power to regulate the
activities of satellite companies incorporated within their bor-
ders or satellite companies that desire to offer service within
their borders. Within the United States, a U.S. registered satel-
lite company will not be able to negotiate a spectrum-sharing
deal with a foreign satellite company that might adversely affect
other U.S. satellite companies or U.S. government communica-
tions policies. Removing a local government from the interfer-
ence coordination process espoused in Solution 1 will not
prevent that government from regulating the spectrum negotia-
tions of one of its companies. This solution encourages a com-
mercially oriented satellite company to lead in spectrum
negotiations where government regulators do not excel.
Local government regulators should be involved in the nego-
tiation process, because they will make the final decision of ap-
proval on any spectrum-sharing solution. Local government
regulators should not, however, lead this process because they
do not have the resources or the authority to lead commercially
oriented spectrum negotiations involving the manipulation of a
satellite company's business, marketing, or financial plans. So-
lution 1 encourages business-led negotiations over interference
coordination, but it does so without removing the power of the
local regulator to make the final decision.
Additionally, the local regulator will make the final decision
in determining the composition of its WRC delegation. Solu-
tion 2 should not change the composition of WRC delegations,
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because member nations of the ITU will be able to staff these
delegations with the lawyers, engineers, and satellite company
representatives that they need to effectively negotiate at the
WRC. Solution 2 only changes the status of the support mem-
bers of the WRC delegation by removing the ITU-created re-
striction that requires these delegates to represent their local
nation. The single delegate who is allowed to vote at the WRC
should be the only official representative of that nation's gov-
ernment at the WRC.
If a nation brings more than one delegate to the WRC, then
that nation can still restrict and control the behavior of its dele-
gates. Solution 2 only changes the perceived status of these del-
egates before the ITU, and it will not change the real
relationship between the supporting delegates and their spon-
soring nation. By lowering the diplomatic status of the support-
ing delegates at the WRC, Solution 2 encourages more open
negotiation between supporting delegates who are no longer of-
ficially affiliated with one nation.
By encouraging satellite companies to represent their own in-
terests before the ITU, Solutions 1 and 2 should actually in-
crease the power of sovereign nations at the ITU. At worst,
these changes should not decrease the power of sovereign na-
tions at the ITU, because these nations could still undermine
the independence of satellite companies through nationaliza-
tion or other methods of control.
VI. DISCUSSION: GLOBAL TRENDS AND THE
SKYBRIDGE DISPUTE
Presently, a global trend toward decreased government re-
striction on commercially funded communications development
exists, even when that development is funded by foreign enti-
ties. 2 Many nations claim that they offer advanced telecommu-
nication services to their people, without overwhelming the
national budget, by allowing commercial entities to fund the de-
velopment of these services.73 Many of the commercial entities
72 Evidence of this reduced government restriction includes foreign nations
privatizing their communications networks and foreign nations reducing restric-
tions on foreign ownership of local telecommunications networks. A good exam-
ple of this is the merger between the British wireless telephone company,
Vodafone, and the American wireless phone company, Air Touch, that recently
was widely covered in the media.
73 Many less developed nations have opened their local telecommunications
markets to foreigners in an attempt to have foreign investors fund telecommuni-
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that propose funding the development of advanced telecommu-
nications services are foreign to the nations that they desire to
serve. These nations protect their sovereign rights to their fre-
quency spectrum by closely regulating the operation of foreign
communications systems within their local borders. The mod-
ern relationship between local governments and foreign com-
munications companies is still difficult, but it is an improvement
over the era when local governments believed that any foreign
communications system operating within their borders was an
uncontrollable threat to their sovereignty.
The commercially funded satellite communications compa-
nies that propose offering advanced telecommunications serv-
ices throughout the world benefit at the local government from
this global trend. These satellite companies would relinquish a
large base of potential customers if local governments instinc-
tively felt they must exclude foreign communications companies
from serving their local populations. A global satellite commu-
nication company's largest regulatory difficulty is not one local
government with a vendetta against that company's satellite ser-
vice."4 Instead, it is caused by its inability to negotiate the use of
one frequency allocation plan with many different local
governments.
As an example, the Skybridge satellite communications system
is a LEO system that serves the entire world with high-speed data
services.75 Skybridge LLC of the United States is the business
entity supporting the Skybridge system, but this company is per-
ceived to be a champion of France and other European states.76
The Skybridge system's use of the Ku-Band frequencies of 12.75
to 18.1 GHz was accepted in principle by many of the nations of
cations development within their borders. Many nations in Africa and Latin
America sell wireless spectrum licenses to foreign companies with the under-
standing that these companies will earn a profit after providing basic wireless
services to that country's people.
74 Some nations may actually have a vendetta against a foreign company serv-
ing its population, but the business entities proposing satellite systems should
have such vendettas addressed within their business plans. As an example, a sat-
ellite company in the United States would not develop a business plan that has
their satellite service depending on customers from a nation that is in armed
conflict with the U.S.
75 Skybridge is a company that has been covered extensively in the press. For
more information see Skybridge's web site at <http://www.skybridgesatellite.
com>.
76 The French Space Agency, the Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES),
backs Skybridge with money, and Alcatel Space of Paris is supposed to be the
prime contractor for this system.
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the world, because these nations do not have communications
systems which would be unable to share this spectrum with
Skybridge.77 The use of these Ku-band frequencies was not im-
mediately accepted by the United States, however, because U.S.
companies offering direct-to-home (DTH) television services
from GEO satellites use some of these same frequencies.
Skybridge LLC can not dismiss the fears of the U.S. government,
because the United States possesses the richest single market for
communications services and holds great political power at the
ITU.
Skybridge has been negotiating with the FCC, the local U.S.
government regulator, to resolve this frequency conflict.7 Addi-
tionally, Skybridge requested that the French government and
other European entities put pressure on the FCC and U.S. satel-
lite companies to agree to an adequate spectrum-sharing plan.
This dispute has lasted years, and it will be difficult for U.S. and
European government regulators to find solutions that are equi-
table to the commercial interests of both Skybridge and the U.S.
DTH satellite companies. This conflict hurts U.S. satellite com-
panies operating in other frequency bands, because local regula-
tors within Europe and elsewhere may retaliate for the
perceived lack of cooperation they are receiving from the U.S.
government over Skybridge. In addition, this dispute could ad-
versely affect spectrum negotiations at the WRC, the ITU, and at
the local regulator level.
The two solutions presented in this paper are designed to ad-
dress such disputes. By allowing satellite companies to lead in-
terference coordination negotiations, Solution 1 places leaders
of Skybridge and the conflicting U.S. DTH satellite companies
face to face. These companies could modify their business and
technical plans, under the guidance (not leadership) of na-
tional regulators, to find an equitable solution. 9 If no solution
is found, the local regulators involved could continue the na-
77 See Federal Communications Commission, Public Notice, DA 98-833 (May 1,
1998) (visited Nov. 21, 1999) <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/International/Pub-
lic-Noticesi 1998/da980833.html>.
78 See id.
79 Skybridge LLC could give each of the U.S. DTH satellite companies an eq-
uity stake in Skybridge on the condition that the U.S. companies help Skybridge
receive a license in the United States. The U.S. DTH companies and Skybridge
are offering different types of communications services; therefore this dispute is
over spectrum and not customers. There is no hurdle to a commercially moti-
vated solution to this dispute.
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tional level negotiations that have been inconclusive over the
last few years.
By limiting WRC delegations to one official delegate, Solution
2 would encourage Skybridge-affiliated WRC delegates to openly
negotiate solutions with the support level delegates of other na-
tions. These negotiated solutions would not be perceived as one
nation's diplomatic position, because the ITU would not misrep-
resent the discussions of lower level delegates as the negotia-
tions of a member nation. These open negotiations should
increase the number of possible solutions available to Skybridge
at the WRC, while decreasing the environment of diplomacy
and secrecy that prevents commercially oriented entities like
Skybridge from communicating.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this paper presents two solutions to help re-
solve frequency spectrum conflicts between business-driven enti-
ties proposing global satellite communications systems. First,
the responsibility for coordinating a satellite system through the
ITU interference coordination process should be left to the en-
tity that originally proposed the system and not to the adminis-
tration or country that supports that entity's interests. Second,
the ITU should allow only one delegate per nation to attend the
World Radio Conference.
Business-driven entities are the force behind the communica-
tions satellite revolution, and they are driving many of the spec-
trum conflicts before the ITU. If national governments or the
ITU had the capability or authority to resolve the spectrum con-
flicts between commercial satellite systems, then the changes
proposed in this paper would be unnecessary. Changing the
ITU Convention to allow satellite systems to represent them-
selves at the WRC and to lead the interference coordination
process would encourage the business entities behind these sys-
tems to lead spectrum negotiations. These negotiations would
still be under the tight control and approval of local regulators,
but leadership would shift to the commercial entities that are
most qualified to negotiate a commercial solution.
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